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ABSTRACT 
This article considers the appropriate application of the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (UNGP) to the mutual funds industry. Mutual funds can impact 
human rights by financially supporting oppressive states or abusive companies. Given the 
indirect nature of such impacts, along with the exclusively external management of the funds, 
this article argues that a unique approach to implementing the UNGP is necessary for this 
industry. Divided into five parts, the article outlines the governance structure of mutual funds 
and the expectations on states and businesses in the UNGP, before assessing the appropriateness 
of applying current guidance for banks and other financial actors to mutual funds. The article 
concludes with practical recommendations for both fund managers and states on the 
implementation of the UNGP in this industry.  
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1. Introduction 
A staggering $31.3 trillion USD was invested in mutual fund assets worldwide at the end of 
2014.1 Mutual funds are institutional investors that pool money into a single entity run by 
professional managers.2 These assets financially support states through the acquisition of bonds,3 
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and businesses through the purchase of company shares.4 A significant form of market-based 
funding,5 mutual funds can have a negative, albeit indirect, impact on human rights by 
supporting abusive regimes or corporations.6 Mutual funds, like other ‘portfolio’ investments, are 
distinguishable from foreign direct investment (FDI) in that the latter typically involves active 
management and monitoring of operations, while portfolio investments do not.7 The difference 
between active and passive management can impact the ability of a business to manage its 
effects on human rights and raises novel questions about how financial actors like mutual funds 
can implement their human rights responsibilities.   
Prominent attention has been given to the impact certain financial actors have on human 
rights, with allegations that banks facilitated suspicious transactions for, or otherwise financed, 
oppressive regimes, including South Africa’s apartheid government, by providing crucial 
funding that ensured the continuation of human rights abuses.8 Yet, the discussion has remained 
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narrow. Scholars9 and industry initiatives10 have primarily addressed the responsibility of banks 
and/or international financial institutions in areas of project financing and loans.11 As explained 
below, the targeted nature of bank loans and project financing distinguishes them from the more 
generalized investments of mutual funds, making the initiatives developed to date inappropriate 
for the mutual fund industry. The nature and purpose of mutual funds requires a different 
approach to human rights than what has been employed in the context of FDI, bank loans, or 
project financing. 
The United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP or 
‘Guiding Principles’)12 offer the most authoritative statement on obligations and responsibilities 
in the field of business and human rights.13 The UNGP rests on three ‘pillars’: states have an 
obligation to ‘protect’ human rights by regulating business impacts; businesses have a 
responsibility to respect human rights, meaning to refrain from negatively impacting human 
rights; and both states and businesses are expected to ensure victims have adequate access to 
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remedies when negative impacts from business activities do occur.14 This article focuses only on 
the first two pillars. While businesses can have positive human rights impacts, the UNGP focus 
on preventing, mitigating, and remediating negative impacts, finding that businesses cannot 
‘offset’ negative impacts with positive ones.15 This article, which brings together authors with 
distinct expertise in mutual fund regulation and in business and human rights, follows that 
approach. The question is not how mutual funds can support good business practices, but what 
the fund, as a business, must do to limit and remediate its own, even indirect, negative human 
rights impacts, and how states should regulate the industry to protect human rights.  
A mutual fund’s impact on human rights will usually be indirect and not the result of its 
active participation in the violations. According to the Guiding Principles, the lack of direct 
participation does not excuse a mutual fund from human rights responsibilities.16 The UNGP 
distinguishes between those impacts that are both directly linked to a business’s operations and 
directly caused by the business (direct impacts) and those impacts that are directly linked to the 
business but are indirectly caused through the conduct of third-parties the business has a 
relationship with (indirect impacts).17 A business’s responsibilities alter slightly based on this 
division, but as explained below, business have responsibilities even for indirect impacts.18  
 The remainder of article is divided into four parts. Part 2 explains the nature and 
structure of mutual funds, highlighting how they differ from banks and other financial and non-
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financial businesses. In discussing mutual funds, we focus on the law of the United Kingdom 
(UK), with some reference to the system in the United States of America (US). The UK system 
provides for the two most common forms of mutual funds used globally,19 allowing for a 
discussion that is relevant to the industry as a whole. Part 3 examines the expectations on 
businesses and states outlined in the Guiding Principles, with a focus on how the UNGP have 
been applied to financial entities. Part 4 analyses the human rights responsibilities of mutual fund 
investors, managers and home states, providing recommendations for fund managers and states. 
Part 5 concludes with practical guidance for mutual funds and states aimed at balancing the 
purpose of mutual funds with the responsibility on those funds to respect human rights.  
2. The Nature of Mutual Funds 
In order to understand the business and human rights implications of mutual funds, it is 
necessary to understand the funds’ purpose and structure. This section explains both while 
considering the factors that set mutual funds apart from other financial actors.  
A. The Purpose and Nature of Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds were developed for the purpose of helping people save money in order to secure 
their future,20 and offer investors a diversified portfolio with limited risks, professional 
management, low costs and liquidity.21 Shares or units are primarily purchased either directly 
from the fund or through institutional channels, including mutual fund advisers and brokerage or 
investment firms.22 Professional management invests the fund’s common pool of money in 
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accordance with agreed-upon objectives.23 The funds are then required to stand ready to redeem 
their shares at net asset value, known as the right to exit.24 For individuals without enough funds 
to justify their own investments,25 and ‘unsophisticated’ investors, meaning those without 
sufficient investment experience and knowledge to appropriately weigh the risks and merits of an 
investment opportunity,26 mutual funds offer a viable investment opportunity.27 Because of their 
purpose, mutual funds are tightly regulated.28  
Mutual funds principally invest in bonds, stocks, short-term money market instruments, 
securities, or a combination of these investments.29 The diversified portfolio is intended to limit 
the risk to investors by ensuring that a sudden change in any one industry or sector does not 
significantly alter the financial security of the fund and its worth.30 These qualities and high 
returns have made mutual funds competitive vehicles in the financial market,31 and have been 
credited with raising the financial sophistication of the population.32   
The nature and purpose of mutual funds distinguish them from other financial services or 
market actors, including bank loans or project financing.33 A bank’s loans can be made 
contingent on targeted human rights impact assessments, directly influencing or binding a 
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corporation or state’s operations.34 A mutual fund’s investment is more general and is unlikely to 
target a specific project or action. The fungibility of the fund’s support means it will be difficult 
to direct the money’s use or track its human rights impact,35 and a fund cannot directly institute 
controls over the company’s decision-making process.36 
Even amongst generalized, market-based financing, mutual funds are again unusual in 
their purpose and regulation. Hedge funds operate without a single investment objective, are 
often designed to circumvent significant regulations, and are limited to ‘sophisticated’ investors, 
meaning those with a high net worth or sufficient investment experience.37 A sovereign wealth 
fund generates revenue for the state that owns it,38 and may carry the totality of the state’s human 
rights responsibilities,39 a higher standard than the UNGP responsibility to respect.40 Mutual 
funds, on the other hand, are highly regulated private, corporate bodies run for commercial 
purposes,41 which also aim to protect the interests of vulnerable investors.42 This means they are 
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subject to the UNGP responsibility to respect, but there are unique considerations in terms of 
how funds address their responsibilities and the role of states in regulating the industry. 
B. The Structure and Operations of Mutual Funds 
 (i) The primary forms of mutual funds 
There are two primary organizational forms for mutual funds.43 First is the corporate 
form, in which the fund is constituted under an instrument of incorporation, giving it a legal 
personality distinct from its shareholders.44 The second form is the trust structure,45 a primarily 
common law concept whereby the mutual fund is established as a trust and managed by a trustee 
for the benefit of the investors.46 A unit trust is constituted under a trust deed.47 The fund does 
not have a separate legal personality,48 and the unitholders directly own the deposited property.49 
The terminology in mutual funds varies between states and most countries outside the common 
law system allow only the corporate form.50 Under both forms, investors can redeem their units 
from the fund directly at any time.51  
While technical differences exist between the two forms, in the areas relevant to this 
article, the two forms operate similarly. Mutual funds rely exclusively on external staff and do 
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not have direct employees.52 This distinguishes them from normal corporate structures, in which 
the business directly employs managers, directors and other employees, alongside any external 
service providers.53 There are two primary fiduciary actors in each type of mutual fund. Under 
the trust fund, these are called the manager and the trustee;54 the counterparts in the corporate 
form are called, respectively, the authorized corporate director (ACD) or board of directors, and 
the depositary.55 For the remainder of this article, we consolidate the technical terms and use 
‘manager’ to refer to both managers and ACD, and ‘trustee’ to refer to both trustees and 
depositaries.  
The manager makes the investment decisions on behalf of the fund under the direction 
and supervision of the trustee, who is responsible for safekeeping the fund’s assets and 
overseeing the manager’s activities.56 Under both forms, the manager and the trustee must be 
separate corporate bodies, both from the fund and from each other.57 Consequently, the fund uses 
only external service providers.58 Both UK59 and US60 law impose fiduciary obligations on 
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mutual fund managers and directors to act in the best interests of the investors, however 
contractual clauses often limit the manager’s liability to the fund to actions or omissions rising to 
the level of negligence, wilful default or fraud.61  
 
 
In addition to the managers and trustees, mutual funds might use other service providers. 
The service providers allowed and involved vary between jurisdictions, but a fund manager will 
often delegate administrative tasks,62 and may delegate specific functions to an investment 
adviser who will find opportunities but cannot make decisions on the fund’s behalf.63  
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(ii) The importance of a fund’s objectives 
Managers must invest the mutual fund’s assets according to the fund’s objectives, which the 
investor accepts upon buying shares or units.64 Understanding the significance of a fund’s 
objectives is important when it comes to regulating the industry. The investment objectives 
define the fund’s fundamental investment aim,65 and investors choose fund types that match their 
personal investment needs and goals. Some funds aim to increase the value of the basic amount 
invested (growth funds), while others seek to provide investors with regular income through the 
payment of dividends (fixed income funds).66 The investment objective often indicates the type 
of assets that constitute the key part of the fund’s investment portfolio.67 For instance, bond 
funds are fixed-income funds that mainly buy debt instruments, such as bonds or governments 
securities,68 whereas a money market fund has a short-term objective, usually investing in 
securities paper that mature more quickly, such as treasury bills and commercial paper.69  
Investment objectives are usually quite detailed, delineating the risks of the fund, the 
rights and responsibilities of the trustee, manager and investors, and the criteria that will guide 
the manager’s decisions.70 Because investment objectives are defined at the outset and are 
binding on the manager, the manager has limited flexibility in terms of what it can purchase.71 
For example, a money market fund’s manager cannot buy instruments that mature over a long 
period because that would breach the fund’s short-term objectives.72  
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C. The Unique Issues with Mutual Funds 
There are several distinct elements to mutual funds that set them apart from other types of 
businesses and that warrant particular attention for the field of business and human rights. First, 
unlike traditional companies, there are no direct employees of the fund.73 As companies are 
generally judged by and through the actions of their employees,74 the purely external nature of 
mutual fund management can raise questions about the fund’s human rights responsibilities. If a 
fund harms human rights, the fund is responsible for the impacts;75 yet there are no employees in 
the fund and the management sits separate from the fund. A mutual fund manager has a duty to 
both the fund as well as to its own separate corporate body, and will seek to acquire the highest 
possible earnings for its corporate body.76 Mutual fund managers may be tempted to invest the 
fund’s assets without regard to human rights in order to gain higher returns for their company. 
While the temptation to prioritize profits over human rights is common across industries, the 
exclusively external nature of mutual fund management carries the potential for unique conflicts 
of interest.77  
To explain the threat, it is helpful to compare mutual funds to traditional parent-
subsidiary relationships, in which a single actor may serve both the parent and the subsidiary in 
different capacities.78 A parent company has an ownership interest in the subsidiary and 
ostensibly suffers from any financial loss experienced by the subsidiary (although sometimes to a 
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lesser extent than if the parent was directly liable).79 Additionally, in limited situations the parent 
can become liable for the actions of the subsidiary.80 With a mutual fund, the manager does not 
have an ownership interest, does not bear the risk and functions as a fully independent and 
external actor.81 While a manager may separately face criminal responsibility for its own 
actions,82 generally managers financially benefit from the fund doing well while imputing 
liability to an entity without assuming attendant financial risks.83 The parent-subsidiary role 
limits risks for the parent, but the manager-fund relationship leaves the manager without 
significant risks for the management company.   
A second significant feature is in the responsibility of mutual funds to buy out shares 
from investors at any time.84 Stocks in traditional companies need to be sold, and the price can 
fluctuate substantially based on the market.85 Shareholders in an individual company have an 
interest in monitoring human rights practices because bad practices can result in civil claims or 
public relations problems, affecting the stock price.86 The diversification of a mutual fund, 
however, limits the impact of any one company’s price fluctuation on the fund’s value.87 
Redemption values are based on the totality of assets in the fund at the time the investor 
exchanges her shares.88 The limited impact of any one company on a fund’s value and the ability 
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to easily redeem shares from the fund means investors are unlikely to experience significant 
losses because of the fund’s human rights impacts.89 
The purpose and structure of mutual funds provides broad access to professional 
investment skills that would otherwise be unavailable to unsophisticated investors. The external 
management distinguishes the fund from other forms of business. The unsophisticated nature of 
the majority of mutual fund investors coupled with the fund’s liquidity means individual 
investors are unlikely to have an interest in the long-term structural decisions of the fund.90 
Collectively, these issues raise questions about how mutual funds can implement their human 
rights responsibilities.  
3. The Demands of Business and Human Rights 
With the nature and structure of mutual funds established, it is important to consider the human 
rights responsibilities of businesses, as well as how these responsibilities have been interpreted 
and applied to the financial services industry. The UNGP set a standard for all business, 
regardless of type and size, and carry an expectation that mutual funds, like all other businesses, 
will respect human rights.91 This section considers the challenges of applying the UNGP to the 
mutual fund industry. 
A. Business and State Responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles  
As noted above, the UNGP assert that states are to protect human rights, businesses should 
respect human rights and both states and businesses should offer adequate remedies when 
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impacts do occur.92 On their own, the UNGP are non-binding but the articulation of state 
responsibility is reflective of existing treaty and customary obligations.93 The Guiding Principles 
intentionally eschewed calls for direct international legal responsibility for businesses,94 and the 
expectations on businesses are expressed only as ‘responsibilities’ that stem from the ‘social 
license to operate’.95 The expectation, however, is that the business responsibility to respect 
should become the minimum legal standard through domestic implementation.96 This section 
considers the state duty to protect and the business responsibility to respect human rights, as 
outlined in the UNGP. 
(i) The state duty to protect 
International and regional human rights courts and treaty bodies have long recognized that each 
human right entails three distinct obligations: respect, protect and fulfil.97 This tripartite typology 
does not explicitly appear in the text of human rights treaties, but is ‘seen as a particular means 
of expressing and conceiving of existing human rights obligations’.98 The obligation to protect 
requires states to take action to prevent third parties from interfering with the realization of 
human rights.99 As the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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(CESCR) has explained, the duty to protect requires ‘establishing appropriate laws and 
regulations, together with monitoring, investigation and accountability procedures to set and 
enforce standards for the performance of corporations’.100 While the state is not responsible 
every time a business interferes with the realization of human rights, a business’s impact on 
human rights ‘can lead to international responsibility of the State’ if the state’s fails to exercise 
‘due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it’.101 Accordingly states must therefore 
take steps to regulate known or likely business impacts on human rights, to supervise and inspect 
businesses and to respond with due care to allegations of new impacts.102 Where a business’s 
actions are lawful but, according to the UNGP, irresponsible, the state is expected to regulate 
proscriptively and to ensure remedies are available if damages occur.103 A failure to regulate 
with due diligence and/or ensure remedies can result in the actions of the business being imputed 
to the state, leading to a violation of the state’s obligations.104 
(ii) The business responsibility to respect 
The responsibility to respect human rights means that businesses should refrain from interfering 
in the realization of human rights.105 The responsibility exists regardless of the entity’s ‘size, 
sector, operational context, ownership and structure’,106 and functions independently from the 
state’s duty to protect so that even where the state fails to adequately regulate, the business must 
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meet its responsibility.107 Similarly, a business’s responsibility is not excused simply because 
others in the same industry fail to meet their responsibilities.108 According to the UNGP, 
businesses are expected ‘to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly 
linked to their operations, products or services’ because of ‘business relationships, even if they 
have not contributed to those impacts’.109 Relevant ‘business relationships’ include associations 
with any ‘entity directly linked to its business operations, products or services’.110 It is the 
existence of a link between an impact and the business’s activities, rather than the business’s 
level of contribution to a human rights violation, that triggers its responsibility to respect.111  
The UNGP suggest that businesses first adopt human rights specific policies and 
practices at the ‘senior level of the businesses’.112 A clear ‘policy commitment’, informed by 
internal and external expertise, should detail ‘the enterprise’s human rights expectations of 
personnel, business partners and other parties directly linked to its operations, products or 
services’.113 The policy should be incorporated into ‘operational policies and procedures’ and 
communicated to relevant personnel and stakeholders.114 Businesses are then to conduct due 
diligence in order to identify salient human rights issues, mitigate their impact and remedy any 
impacts that cannot be avoided.115  
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Due diligence requires businesses assess both actual and potential human rights impacts, 
respond to those impacts and monitor developments on an ongoing basis.116 Internal and external 
human rights experts and relevant stakeholders should be consulted.117 Businesses are to 
consider those human rights contained in the International Bill of Human Rights118 and the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, but may choose to concentrate on 
the ‘most significant’ impacts caused by their operations, but should include in their assessment 
impacts that are ‘due to … clients’ operating context’.119 Results of the due diligence process 
should influence the business’s decision-making processes, leading to the mitigation and 
remediation of impacts.120  
While the standard for the responsibility to respect is universal, how a business is 
expected to respond may be influenced by factors such as ‘[w]hether the business enterprise 
causes or contributes to an adverse impact, or whether it is involved solely because the impact is 
directly linked to … a business relationship’ and ‘[t]he extent of its leverage in addressing the 
adverse impact’.121 Other factors enumerated by the UNGP include ‘how crucial the relationship 
is … the severity of the abuse, and whether terminating the relationship … would have adverse 
human rights consequences’.122 Where a company can refrain from engaging in a harmful 
activity, the expectation is that it will do so.123 Where it causes or contributes to a harm, it is 
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responsible for attempting to mitigate the harm and for providing remedies when harms occur.124 
Even where a business does not cause or contribute to the harm, the business is expected to 
exercise leverage to limit or mitigate the human rights impacts by those entities with which it has 
a business relationship.125 This approach requires a business to be actively engaged in reducing 
its human rights impacts. Responses should be tracked in order to determine the chosen path’s 
effectiveness and the results communicated to stakeholders and interested parties.126 The process 
is intended to be cyclical so that ongoing due diligence efforts are enhanced by previous results 
and lessons learned.127 
Implementation of the UNGP has been slow.128 While an increasing number of 
businesses are adopting and reporting on human rights policies, many companies still fail to 
recognize their human rights responsibilities while others may recognize their responsibility but 
fail to report on their practices in a substantial way.129 Additionally, some corporate reporting on 
human rights is rather shallow, either lacking significant detail or intentionally focusing on less 
consequential human rights issues and obscuring significant harms.130 This currently makes it 
difficult for financial actors to evaluate every business in which they would invest. We suggest 
practical solutions for this problem in Part 4.B., below.  
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B. Applying the UNGP to Financial Entities 
(i) The business responsibility to respect 
Applying the UNGP to financial actors has proven difficult at times because ‘money is never the 
direct means by which gross human rights violations are perpetrated’.131 However, this does not 
absolve financial entities from responsibility under the UNGP, even when their conduct does not 
legally rise to the level of financial complicity.132 Complicity under international criminal law 
requires an action that has a ‘substantial effect’ on the commission of the violation.133 Proving 
complicity for human rights violations based on a financial transaction has been difficult because 
the transaction is often ‘removed from human rights violations carried out by their recipients’.134  
The UNGP uses a broader, and perhaps less technical approach, recognizing both legal 
and non-legal forms of complicity.135 Guiding Principle 13 explains that the responsibility to 
respect ‘requires’ businesses ‘[a]void causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts 
through their own activity’(emphasis added).136 The ‘contributing to’ standard includes a broader 
understanding of complicity than that employed by international criminal law.137 John Ruggie, 
author of the UNGP, concluded that ‘[c]omplicity in the business and human rights context 
refers to the indirect involvement of companies in human rights abuses’, and can refer to 
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situations in which ‘a company knowingly contributed to another’s abuse of human rights’.138 
‘[I]ndirect involvement’ refers to instances when ‘the company itself does not actually carry out 
the abuse’.139 The effect of the contribution appears less relevant under the UNGP when 
compared to international criminal law.140 The UNGP standard appears to be in addition to, and 
triggered at a lower threshold than, any criminal complicity that uses the ‘substantial effect’ test. 
If a business benefits from abuse, or financially supports an abusive regime, it appears to have 
triggered this lower threshold, even if the indirect nature of the support means a criminal or civil 
case for complicity cannot be sustained.141  
The difference between the two approaches to ‘complicity’ appears to have caused some 
confusion among financial actors. The Thun Group of Banks, an informal network of ten banks, 
has inaccurately asserted that ‘a bank would generally not be considered to be causing or 
contributing to adverse human rights impacts arising from its clients’ operations because the 
impact is not occurring as part of the bank’s own activities’.142 While recognizing that banks are 
expected to conduct due diligence on the impact of their financial transactions, the Thun Group 
argues that bank’s conduct ‘does not shift responsibility for the impact from the client …. to the 
bank.’143 The banks posit that their relationships with clients do not give rise to the bank’s 
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responsibility to respect human rights.144 They suggest banks can encourage better client 
behaviour but do not incur responsibility for what the clients do with the bank’s financing.145 
This position mirrors earlier understandings of ‘corporate social responsibility,’ or ‘ethical’ 
initiatives, in which businesses could undertake positive actions if they chose to but did not have 
any responsibility for their negative human rights impacts unless they fell afoul of local laws.146 
Ruggie, the UN Working Group on business and human rights, scholars and civil society 
have rightly rebuked the Thun Group for its approach.147 Ruggie responded by explaining that 
the ‘critical distinction’ is not who undertakes the activities – the bank or a client – but whether 
the harm is one the bank is ‘contributing to’ or is one committed by a third party to which the 
bank is ‘“directly linked” through their business relationships even without’ the bank ‘having 
caused or contributed to the harm.’148 In the former case the bank’s responsibility to respect is 
triggered, even though it does not directly undertake the actions causing the harm.149 Examples 
of this include, according to Ruggie, where a bank grants ‘a general corporate loan to a private 
prison company that is alleged to engage in severe human rights abuses.’150 In this case, the bank 
should undertake due diligence and impose ‘strict conditions’ if it grants the loan.151 The UN 
Working Group similarly recognized that a bank can cause or contribute to an impact, for 
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instance if it ‘provides a loan for an infrastructure project that leads to widespread displacement 
of local communities’ unless the loan requires adequate safeguards or mitigation techniques.152 
Where the bank has not failed to meet its responsibility to respect, but the bank can still be 
expected to use its leverage to influence a client’s conduct.153  
While the understandings presented by Ruggie and the Working Group are not binding, 
they are clearly authoritative interpretations given that Ruggie drafted the UNGP and the 
Working Group has been entrusted by states to, inter alia, ‘provide advice and recommendations 
regarding the development of domestic legislation and policies relating to business and human 
rights’.154 Moreover, they align with the plain reading of the UNGP, which recognizes that the 
responsibility for human rights attaches to a wider range of actions than those that immediately 
cause a negative impact.155 The examples provided by Ruggie and the Working Group 
demonstrate that financial actors can contribute to a harm simply by providing necessary 
financing, even if the financing is general in nature.156 In such cases, the financial actor has a 
responsibility o mitigate its impacts and to provide remedies.157  
Like a bank, a mutual fund could contribute to a human rights violation by financing an 
oppressive regime or a company involved in human rights abuses.158 This would trigger the 
lower threshold of the UNGP responsibility to respect while not necessarily rising to the level of 
complicity in international criminal law. In the context of mutual funds, mitigating an impact 
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would mean selling an investment and moving the assets to different investments. While the 
UNGP recognize that businesses may need to continue ‘crucial’ relationships despite human 
rights harms, the understanding of a ‘crucial’ relationship is narrow, referring to circumstances 
where another entity ‘provides a product or service that is essential’ for the business ‘for which 
no reasonable alternative source exists’.159 As noted above, few corporations have human rights 
commitments or due diligence processes,160 making it difficult for mutual funds to invest only in 
human rights compliant companies or states. Given the purpose of mutual funds, however, there 
will often be equal or relatively equal enterprises to invest in. In such circumstances, the UNGP 
would seemingly require mutual fund managers to prioritize companies and states that inculcate 
good human rights standards over investments with poor human rights compliance and to 
increasingly move assets to companies and states that respond well to human rights concerns. 
Fund managers should justify investments in non-compliant businesses and states by explaining 
to stakeholders and shareholders the reasons for the purchase and the lack of legitimate and 
available alternatives.161 
(ii) The limitations of human rights initiatives for financial actors 
Effectively changing the treatment of human rights within the financial markets has proven 
difficult.162 Significant for this piece, Mary Dowell-Jones has found that there is a lack of clear 
and appropriate guidance addressing issues of financial actors generally and the needs of specific 
products and actors.163 Most soft-law and advisory instruments addressing the human rights 
responsibilities of financial actors consider lending policies and project financing activities in 
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which the financial entity can exert clear control or influence over corporate conduct.164 Where 
other market actors have been addressed, it has been often through ‘ethical’ initiatives, some of 
which have been widely embraced but have translated into limited change in practice.165 Of these 
‘social responsibility’ initiatives,166 the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (‘UNPRI’), a 
voluntary and industry-led initiative, is the most substantial effort aimed at institutional 
investors, like mutual fund managers.167 It is necessary to examine why these initiatives are 
insufficient for addressing business and human rights standards in the context of mutual funds.  
First, banks and financial institutions can require human rights policies and due diligence 
as a condition for loans or project financing.168 In doing so, banks and financial institutions can 
distinguish between companies within a corporate group’s operations or between projects a 
single business undertakes.169 Imagine Company A is the parent company to Company B and 
Company C. When granting a loan or project financing, a bank can distinguish between 
operations conducted by Company B and Company C. Similarly, if Company C has traditionally 
operated only in one state, like Nigeria, and seeks to develop a new project in a nearby state, like 
Benin, a bank can distinguish between the two sets of operations, making loans for the Benin 
operations contingent on human rights standards applicable to that project regardless of 
Company C’s record in Nigeria. In these circumstances, the bank or financial institution can 
manage its direct human rights impact. Mutual fund investments, on the other hand, generally do 
not distinguish between companies within a corporate group or between operations within a 
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single business. Shares are usually publicly traded only for a corporate group’s parent company 
rather than for each entity within the group.170 This significant difference makes the guidance 
developed for bank loans and project financing generally inappropriate for fund managers. 
 The UNPRI attempt to help investors play an active role in supporting responsible 
corporate conduct.171 UNPRI investors are encouraged to work together to pressure companies to 
adopt social policies,172 and agree to ‘incorporate’ environmental, social and governance issues 
‘into investment analysis and decision-making processes’.173 Like the Thun Group’s approach, 
however, the UNPRI views an institutional investor’s role as encouraging others to comply with 
human rights rather than of directly managing its own human rights impact. As a result, the 
UNPRI’s approach to ‘laggard’ companies – those that have failed to adopt a human rights 
commitment even on paper – is to ask signatories to ‘request the company publishes a human 
rights commitment’.174 Investors are not required or expected to refrain from investing even 
when there are serious human rights impacts.175 This is a lower threshold than what is required 
by the UNGP. 
For the UNGP, the responsibility to respect requires action beyond just consideration of 
human rights or advocacy for better commitments by others.176 Where alternatives exist, the 
UNGP seemingly expect managers to seek out and prioritize those alternatives as a means of 
mitigating the fund’s human rights impacts. Investments can be moved with limited difficulty, 
                                                   
170
 See Ting, The Taxation of Corporate Groups Under Consolidation: An International Comparison (2013) at 229. 
171
 Weber, supra n 129 at 9. 
172
 Ibid at 4. 
173
 See UNPRI, ‘The Six Principles’, available at: www.unpri.org/about/the-six-principles [last accessed 4 May 
2017]; see also Rinaldi, et al., ‘The Role of Stakeholder Engagement and Dialogue within the Sustainability 
Accounting and Reporting Process’ in Bebbington, et al., Sustainability Accounting and Accountability, 2nd edn 
(2007) at 92.   
174
 UNPRI, Human Rights and the Extractive Industry: Why Engage, Who to Engage, How to Engage, (2015), at 9, 
available at: [last accessed 31 August 2016]. 
175
 See UNPRI, ‘The Six Principles,’ supra n 173. 
176
 Compare ibid; UNGP, supra n 12 at Principles 13, 17, and accompanying commentary. 
27 
 
suggesting the relationship between a fund and its investments will never be a ‘crucial’ 
relationship for the fund. Under the UNGP, the fungibility of assets means human rights should 
become a prerequisite for a mutual fund’s investment, rather than one of many considerations. 
The lack of adequate initiatives for mutual funds makes it necessary to revisit briefly the state’s 
responsibility to regulate the industry for the protection of human rights.  
C. The State’s Responsibility 
The duty to protect requires states to adopt general regulations appropriate to all industries as 
well as specific regulations for individual industries where necessary.177 Traditionally, the 
obligation to protect is assumed to attach territorially, with states responsible for regulating the 
impacts that occur on their own territory.178 Mutual funds are generally created and managed 
within one state (the ‘home state’) and primarily purchase shares on the markets of that state.179 
Their human rights impacts, however, will often occur on the territory of a different state 
(effectively the ‘host state’180) through the acts of a business or a state in which the fund invests. 
This raises an important question about which state bears the duty to protect, the home or the 
host state. While international law provides several jurisdictional bases, the most widely 
accepted are territorial, meaning the conduct occurs within the territory of the state, and active 
personality, meaning the person committing the action is a national of the state.181 Other forms of 
jurisdiction are either functionally limited, like universal jurisdiction, or are disputed, such as the 
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protective and passive personality principles.182 Since both the operations and nationality of the 
fund belong with the home state, the host state may not have jurisdiction under international law 
to regulate the fund. If the home state is the only one capable of regulating the fund’s activities, 
does it bear the duty to protect, even though the impacts are felt abroad?  
The debate over home states’ human rights responsibilities has been pivotal in the field of 
business and human rights.183 International law has long recognized that while territorial 
jurisdiction is the standard, active personality jurisdiction gives states the authority to regulate 
the actions of their citizens abroad through regulatory measures and criminal sanctions.184 Does 
this right ever become a duty? For several human rights treaty bodies, responsible for overseeing 
state compliance with UN human rights treaties, the answer is yes.185 CESCR has issued General 
Comments,186 a public statement187 and Concluding Observations188 all asserting that there is a 
duty to regulate and redress corporate citizens’ human rights impacts even when those impacts 
occur abroad.189 This position has been endorsed by the Human Rights Committee, the 
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Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination.190 
 The mandatory use of active personality jurisdiction comes with concerns about the 
potential for neocolonialist control by developed states who could undermine the sovereign right 
of host states to determine and set policy in their own best interests.191 Some scholars also worry 
that if the duty to protect is transferred to home states, host states could in practice rely on that to 
avoid meeting their own obligations, undermining the protection of human rights.192 Claims of 
home state responsibility normally raise these complex considerations about the relationship 
between states, but in the context of mutual funds such concerns are largely misplaced. States are 
generally recognized as having wide latitude to regulate activities within their state even when 
that activity has extraterritorial impact.193 Given a mutual fund’s nationality and the locus of its 
activity are usually limited to the home state, the only practical approach to the duty to protect is 
to find it attaches to the home state, which is required to ensure funds adopt adequate policies 
and practices necessary to respect human rights. These regulations would fall squarely within a 
home state’s traditional right to regulate despite the indirect impact on host states. The state duty 
to protect is therefore best understood in this context as attaching to the home state and will be 
treated as such for the remainder of this article. 
4. Applying the Responsibilities of States and Mutual Funds 
Based on the foregoing discussion, this section analyses the relationship and responsibilities of 
investors, mutual fund managers and states in addressing the impacts of a mutual fund on human 
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rights. There are two issues that are particular to the mutual fund industry. First, funds are 
designed to both attract and protect investors who may be uneducated about the market and the 
impact of their decisions. As a result, the influence of the fund’s investors is likely to be limited. 
Second, as explained above, mutual funds do not have ‘employees’ acting on their behalf, only 
external managers, advisers and service providers, raising questions about the role of the mutual 
fund manager. This section addresses these issues in turn before considering the types of 
regulations states may need to adopt to fulfill their duty to protect. 
A. The Effectiveness of Investor Activism 
In ordinary companies, investors can play a key role in addressing human rights by using their 
influence as shareholders to encourage companies to avoid, mitigate and redress adverse human 
rights impacts. Shareholders can draw attention to human rights issues through shareholders 
proposals,194 a practice that has proven fundamental for placing human rights issues on the 
schedule of US corporations.195 UK shareholders have the right to ask the directors of the 
company to call for a general meeting.196 Shareholder proposals gained prominence during the 
successful anti-apartheid divestment movement of the 1970s and 1980s,197 and shareholders 
continue to successfully advance proposals and to advocate on human rights.198  
Unlike in traditional businesses, investor engagement with mutual fund managers is 
unlikely to be effective.199 The fund is set up so that managers can act swiftly, while trustees 
ensure that the substance and process of the manager’s decisions are appropriate in light of the 
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investment objectives.200 Investors often choose mutual funds to lessen the burden of managing 
these investments.201 The ‘right to exit’202 means investors can quickly leave a fund without 
facing significant financial impacts.203 Together, these factors suggest that investors are unlikely 
to attempt to influence the fund management or to seek to ensure the fund respects human rights 
on a long-term basis.  
Despite the limited likelihood of investor activism, there is a business case for mutual 
funds to consider human rights. A company’s failure to respect human rights can have adverse 
financial consequences on the company, which in turn can decrease the value of the company’s 
shares.204 A failure by fund managers to consider the human rights implications of their 
investments has the potential to undermine confidence in the fund.   
B. The Role of Managers and Trustees in Mutual Fund Due Diligence 
In this section, we offer suggestions as to how to operationalize the UNGP in the mutual fund 
industry. Because the issue has not been addressed directly before, we draw on the standards 
established by the UNGP to suggest practical ways in which fund managers can implement their 
human rights responsibilities. We focus on four areas: the responsibility of funds to incorporate 
human rights into their investment objectives; how managers can set priorities for due diligence; 
how to design and implement the due diligence; and finally, the potential that the responsibility 
to respect may require a fund to divest from an investment. 
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Generally, the burden for complying with the UNGP falls on a business’s internal 
leadership – senior managers, directors and employees – who are employed by or for the benefit 
of the company and who are expected to adopt policies and procedures that embed respect for 
human rights throughout the organization.205 As explained above, mutual funds lack any internal 
employees.206 One might suggest that the lack of internal employees means that there is an open 
question about human rights responsibilities in the context of mutual funds, or that the 
responsibility to respect should default to the investors. This would be an inappropriate reading 
of the UNGP. Mutual fund managers – who as a separate corporate entity also have their own 
responsibility to respect human rights – technically sit outside the fund, but are directly 
responsible for its conduct. Only the manager can make decisions about the fund’s operations 
and conduct – a structure that is necessary for protecting the purpose of mutual funds207 – and the 
manager should therefore carry the responsibility for human rights due diligence. Below, we 
offer some suggestions as to how they can do this. 
While the managers have the primary role, trustees are obligated to ensure managers are 
conducting themselves appropriately in light of the fund’s obligations and responsibilities.208 As 
with managers, the trustees, as a separate corporate body, have both a responsibility when 
operating on behalf of the fund, and their own distinct human rights responsibility.209 The 
trustee’s responsibility is not to substitute their judgement for the manager’s, but to supervise the 
manager’s conduct of operations and ensure that the manager gives due consideration to relevant 
factors while implementing the investment objectives.210 The recommendations below are 
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primarily aimed at managers but simultaneously inform the trustees’ role and set operational 
standards for which trustees should hold managers accountable. 
(i) Incorporating human rights into investment objectives 
The commitment to human rights due diligence should be incorporated into funds’ investment 
objectives.211 While normally the UNGP expect businesses to adopt a ‘policy commitment’, 
which suggests a non-binding standard,212 the mutual fund’s investment objectives dictate what 
the fund managers can do and what issues must guide their considerations and their 
investments.213 The specificity of these objectives means that there is limited flexibility for fund 
managers to operate outside the objectives, or to include other factors into their decisions.214 As a 
result, it is important for managers to ensure a clear commitment to human rights within the 
investment objectives and to specify the contours of that commitment.  
To offer clarity for both the manager and the investors, investment objectives should 
identify how managers define human rights, what data and information they will use to evaluate 
human rights impacts, as well as the range of actions that can be taken in response to negative 
impacts and the timeline for implementing those actions.215 Without explicit criteria, managers 
may feel constrained in their consideration of human rights, or they may feel it is acceptable to 
sacrifice human rights compliance in favour of other outcomes. The inclusion of clear standards 
in the investment objectives can counteract both of these impulses and oblige the fund to 
consider human rights as part of the decision-making process. As is discussed below, a fund may 
not be able to conduct due diligence on all of its investments because of limited personnel or 
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finances. A manager should develop, and identify in the investment objectives, criteria for 
establishing priorities within the due diligence process. We suggest a four-prong approach for 
setting priorities below. 
(ii) Establishing priorities 
Mutual fund managers already engage in comprehensive risk management, using information 
from a variety of sources to assess potential risks and establish policies aimed at avoiding or 
mitigating those risks to the fund.216 This process should be replicated for human rights, only this 
time the focus must be on the risks posed not to the fund but to third parties.217 Not all mutual 
funds, and not all individual investments, will have an equal impact on human rights. 
Additionally, mutual funds operate with a small number of associated personnel,218 and those 
individuals need to be able to respond quickly to fluctuations in the market, making it unrealistic 
to expect robust due diligence for each investment. The UNGP make it clear that the process for 
due diligence can and should be altered because of the size of a business.219 Managers can 
consider the size of the fund – as measured by its financial value – as a relevant factor when 
designing an appropriate due diligence process. This does not mean that smaller firms or funds 
can ignore human rights, but rather that the recommendations that follow can be scaled up or 
down to meet the abilities of the fund itself.  
Similarly, limited human rights compliance by states and other businesses means mutual 
fund managers may not be able to immediately, fully meet their responsibility to respect. When 
practical or budgetary constraints prohibit full compliance with economic, social and cultural 
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rights, CESCR has found states are bound by certain immediate (‘minimum core’) obligations, 
while full compliance may come later.220 A similar standard seems appropriate here. While 
mutual funds may not be able to fully meet their responsibility to respect, they should establish 
policies and procedures that allow them to regularly increase their compliance.  
Managers should employ human rights advisers to consult on the design of the due 
diligence process.221 The UNGP indicate that seeking and employing professional advice on 
human rights issues is a minimum expectation on businesses.222 Without adequate advice and 
information, it is impossible to meet the due diligence standard in the UNGP. Separately, trustees 
should employ their own independent human rights experts to examine the process employed by 
the manager. A careful balance needs to be struck here as the question for a trustee’s human 
rights experts must not be whether they would have made a specific investment, but rather 
whether the manager, both procedurally and substantively, is adequately considering human 
rights and whether the process for addressing risks is capable of appropriately capturing and 
conveying those risks.  
Managers who operate several funds can use a single due diligence process for multiple 
funds and, based on the UNGP, may be expected to engage in more serious due diligence 
regardless of the size of any individual fund.223 Managers can also work with other institutional 
investors, through initiatives like the UNPRI, to determine significant human rights risks.224 The 
responsibility of a manager in this case, or the responsibility of several managers in instances of 
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collaboration, could have implications for issues of liability in cases where remedies are 
required, but those implications, as with the more general issue of remediation, sit beyond the 
remit of this article. 
Where priorities need to be set, the UNGP indicate that salient risks can be prioritized.225 
Businesses with physical operations may be able to find common risks throughout its operations 
and learn from past practices.226 But for mutual funds, each new investment is likely to trigger 
different risks depending on the business, the industry and the state of operations. This means 
that the ‘most severe risks’227 may be less clear at the start of the due diligence process for 
mutual funds than for other businesses. Developing a pragmatic means of prioritizing may 
therefore be more difficult for financial actors than for other businesses. A four-prong approach 
may be helpful. First, significant financial holdings suggest a greater potential for the fund to 
impact human rights and should receive prioritization. Determining which investments are 
‘significant’ will require a case-by-case assessment that takes into account, for example, the 
fund’s investment objectives, the net amount of the investment and the percentage of the fund 
that is being invested. Second, managers should consider whether the targeted industry, state, or 
individual business is known for severe human rights impacts. While the UNGP are premised on 
the belief that all businesses can impact human rights, some industries, companies and states 
have a history of serious human rights impacts or violations.228 Fund managers should use past 
allegations of abuse to help set priorities for new due diligence. Third, fund managers can 
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undertake a more limited review for any investments that do not raise particular concerns under 
first or second prongs. Finally, if a limited review suggests significant problems with an 
investment, a more in-depth due diligence is needed, even if the size of the investment is not 
significant. All investments should get some due diligence, but they do not all need to have the 
same due diligence. Setting priorities can help managers better engage with due diligence 
appropriate to the size and scale of their operations. 
(iii) Undertaking due diligence and mitigating impacts  
In carrying out human rights due diligence, managers should again utilize human rights experts 
to inform their decisions.229 Fund managers should use available information to determine the 
risks posed to the human rights of third parties by a company or state’s operations, to identify 
strategies for mitigation and to decide whether the fund is likely to be able to influence the 
company or state to better respect human rights.230 The due diligence process should occur 
before a new investment is made, if possible, and the findings should be reviewed on an ongoing 
basis so that new information and risks continually inform managers’ decisions.231  
Determining the ‘right’ sources to consult can be difficult. When investing in state bonds 
or state-owned companies, managers should consider information available through public 
disclosures, including reports developed by states and civil society for the UN human rights 
bodies and procedures, as well as the responses and recommendations of those bodies.232  When 
investing in corporations or other funds, managers should review company disclosures. Since, 
unlike a bank, a mutual fund is unable to delineate where its money goes once it makes an 
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investment, a mutual fund’s due diligence must take account of the corporation or the state as a 
whole. Unfortunately, as UNPRI signatories have experienced, companies often fail to recognize 
their human rights responsibilities or fail to report on their practices in a substantial and complete 
way.233 Relying exclusively on corporate reporting is therefore unlikely to produce meaningful 
or actionable information and managers should consider news reports and information from 
nongovernmental organizations, that addresses the individual entity, the industry generally and 
the human rights situations in those states in which the targeted company frequently operates. 
This is not an exhaustive list of sources to consult, as new information will come to light on an 
ongoing basis. It is therefore probably less important that managers identify the ‘right’ sources as 
it is for the manager to take account of sources from different perspectives and to stay abreast of 
developments within the relevant state, company and industry. The use of human rights advisers 
may be crucial in helping managers to stay abreast of developments and identify priorities for 
further due diligence. 
After the initial assessments are done, salient risks deserve closer scrutiny.234 According 
to the UNGP, fund managers should discuss these risks with the leadership of the company or 
state in which they are investing,235 and use their leverage to try to affect positive change.236 
Here, the fund’s investment objectives can be useful in demonstrating to states and companies 
the legal standards required of the fund’s managers, and the expectations the company or state 
needs to meet throughout its operations. The managers should also consult relevant stakeholders, 
including local and international nongovernmental organizations, trade unions and victim 
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advocacy groups.237 These consultations should be aimed at gathering information about the 
impact of the company and the company’s mitigation techniques.238 Based on the information 
secured in these meetings, the mutual fund manager needs to determine whether to invest, refrain 
from investing, or divest their holdings. 
(iv) Diverting or divestment may become a necessity 
As noted above, the responsibility to respect suggests that mutual fund managers should 
prioritize investments in companies with strong human rights standards, and as they can move 
their investments into such companies and away from companies with negative human rights 
impacts.239 If a fund attempts but fails to affect change within a targeted company, the manager 
must consider how to mitigate the fund’s impacts.240 Here, the difficulty with finding 
investments, either corporations or states, with strong human rights records becomes important. 
While mutual fund managers are currently unlikely to avoid human rights impacts by investing 
only in ‘good’ companies or states, where an impact is serious or sustained and the fund is 
unable to influence or secure changes the responsibility to respect may become a responsibility 
to divest.241 This is the corollary to the conclusion that fund managers should prioritize 
investments with strong human rights compliance; businesses and states with negative human 
rights records need to be avoided. A complete discussion and analysis of divestment as a duty is 
beyond the scope of this article but scholarly analysis and practical discussion on this issue is 
necessary to guide both fund managers and states.  
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 (v) Concluding observations on the responsibility of fund managers 
We recognize the limitations of these recommendations, which are an imperfect response to the 
expectations in the UNGP. Without a sufficient number of corporations or states meeting their 
human rights responsibilities, it is difficult to impose any further immediate duties on mutual 
funds. In order to give effect to both the purpose of a mutual fund and the demands of human 
rights, a balance needs to be struck until a stronger system of human rights reporting on 
corporate and state impacts is developed. When corporate human rights compliance and 
reporting reaches appropriate thresholds, both in number and substance, the responsibilities 
attached to mutual funds should correspondingly increase. Greater compliance with the 
responsibility to respect in other industries will increase the responsibility on mutual funds to 
divert their investments from non-compliant businesses and states to those businesses or states 
that provide robust compliance mechanisms and a strong record of due diligence.  
A more significant barrier is, of course, garnering the necessary will to act on this issue. 
It seems fairly obvious that the Thun Group’s proposed application of the UNGP is borne not out 
of a desire to avoid human rights responsibilities but to avoid legal liability when banks prioritize 
profits over human rights compliance. The Thun Group itself recognizes that there is an 
expectation on banks to undertake human rights due diligence.242 What the banks argue is that 
their failure to abide by their responsibility should not lead them to incur legal liability for 
contributing to an impact caused by a client’s actions.243 Inevitably, the proposals here will 
similarly face resistance from mutual fund managers.244 We wish to stress that the proposals here 
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take into account the peculiarities of the mutual fund industry, but they do not ask more of the 
mutual fund industry, or financial actors as a whole, than the singular expectation equally applied 
to all industries and businesses: implementation of the ‘responsibility to respect’.  
C. The Need for State Action 
The state duty to protect appears most important when market conditions are unlikely to generate 
necessary change. Because mutual funds are intended, in part, to assist ‘unsophisticated’ 
investors, resulting in limited shareholder engagement, market conditions alone are unlikely to 
generate change. It is therefore necessary to again consider the state duty to protect, which, as 
noted above, we treat as an obligation of the home state.245 In this section, we outline 
recommendations for home states in terms of regulations appropriate for the mutual fund 
industry. These recommendations mirror those for the funds themselves in order to ensure that 
the two work together to close compliance gaps that currently exist. 
Neither the UK nor the US regulations that require managers to adopt comprehensive risk 
management processes, assess potential risks or problems in advance and establish proper 
policies to avoid those risks or minimize their impacts, reference the fund’s impact on human 
rights.246 States should require funds to employ due diligence standards based on objective 
criteria that address the impact of the fund on human rights and to identify those standards within 
the fund’s investment objectives. Mutual fund managers should be expected to assess, monitor 
and periodically review the adequacy and effectiveness of the human rights risk management 
policy, and trustees should be required to oversee this process. Finally, states should consider 
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whether, when and how to mandate divestment from entities where there is a pattern of serious 
abuse.  
States should require regular reports to shareholders that address (1) the steps taken in 
furtherance of the fund’s responsibility to respect, (2) significant human rights risks in the 
portfolio, (3) the human rights impacts of significant holdings, and (4) the steps the manager will 
take to mitigate or remediate any impacts. Reporting regulations, however, are of limited use and 
do not on their own fulfil either a fund’s responsibility to respect or the states’ duty to protect. 
They are recommended as a first step specifically because many businesses in which funds might 
invest do not yet meet their own human rights responsibilities, and many states do not yet 
effectively regulate businesses for the protection of human rights. As states and other industries 
increase their own human rights compliance, states should increase the requirements on mutual 
fund managers, ensuring that they not only report on their human rights standards, but also 
undertake clear and increasingly strong due diligence and mitigation techniques.  
To encourage and secure compliance, states should also develop both ‘sticks’ and 
‘carrots’ for fund managers.247 Among the ‘sticks’ might be regulatory fines or limited access to 
markets if a fund has inadequate investment objectives or fails to meet the investment objectives 
on human rights. Among the carrots could be early access to preferred state bonds for robust 
assessment programs or for establishing or participating in a network of institutional investors 
that work together on business and human rights due diligence.  
As with the recommendations for managers, these are admittedly imperfect solutions to a 
problem posed by the limited compliance of other states and business with the UNGP. 
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Introducing a regulatory framework, however, is a significant step forward. Requiring 
compliance standards for mutual funds has the additional benefit of using market forces to 
encourage non-financial businesses to improve their human rights compliance. States should 
continually return to and reassess their mutual fund regulations as both human rights compliance 
in the market and state regulation of other industries expands.  
5. Conclusion 
This article has examined how states and mutual funds can better respond to the human rights 
impacts of the mutual fund industry. Addressing the various market actors is an important step to 
closing the governance gap that currently exists in regards to the financing of abusive states and 
corporations. This article has raised the issue of mutual funds with the hope of opening the 
discussion beyond banks and project financing. It has focused on the state duty to protect and the 
business responsibility to respect with the expectation that future scholarship will consider the 
issue of remediation.248  
The issues raised by the impact of mutual funds on human rights are complex. Unlike a 
traditional, non-financial business, mutual funds are unlikely to cause human rights harms. 
Instead, they will only contribute to human rights impacts through the financing of others’ 
actions. As explained in this article, however, the UNGP use a lower threshold for ‘complicity’ 
than what is currently employed in international criminal law, suggesting that mutual funds have 
a responsibility to respect even when the immediate cause of the impact is not directly 
attributable to the fund. Where an impact is unavoidable, businesses, including mutual funds, can 
use their leverage to push for change while mitigating their contribution to the impact. 
                                                   
248
 Discussion surrounding Thun Group’s recent discussion paper demonstrates the need for such scholarship. See 
supra n 157. 
44 
 
Unfortunately, unlike banks and other financial entities, mutual funds are unable to distinguish 
between corporate entities within a particular group or between projects operated by a single 
business. As a result, they have less leverage, on their own, to demand that businesses conduct 
human rights assessments or change their policies, and fewer options for mitigating their impact.  
This article offers a few suggestions for how states and mutual funds can respond to the 
industry’s human rights impacts. The burden for ensuring the responsibility to respect falls on 
fund managers and trustees, despite the fact that they both technically sit outside the fund’s 
corporate or trust structure. Trustees should hold managers accountable for establishing 
appropriate policies and procedures in regards to human rights. In turn, managers must assess, 
manage, mitigate and remedy human rights impacts. Finally, home states should be the duty-
bearers in regards to the obligation to protect and must establish clear regulatory standards for 
mutual funds, managers and trustees.  
Because of limited human rights compliance in other industries and by states, it will be 
difficult for managers or states to immediately implement fully their UNGP responsibilities. This 
article recommends certain steps that can be undertaken immediately, with the intention of a 
progressive realization of the fund’s responsibilities. Mutual fund managers and trustees can 
begin by hiring human rights advisers to help develop due diligence standards and include 
human rights language into new investment objectives. When they have human rights due 
diligence practices in place, managers can prioritize for investment those states and companies 
that take human rights seriously. Trustees can check and supervise the work of managers by 
employing independent human rights experts to ensure that the due diligence process developed 
is procedural and substantively sound. As respect for human rights becomes more systematized 
and as states better regulate other industries, mutual fund managers can be expected to undertake 
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more extensive due diligence. Simultaneously, states can adopt regulations requiring fund 
managers to report on their human rights standards and introduce regulations requiring managers 
to directly incorporate human rights standards are into the investment objectives. The process of 
ensuring the mutual fund industry fully complies with the UNGP responsibility to respect will 
take time. This should not be a deterrent to taking these immediate actions that are necessary for 
respecting and protecting human rights. 
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